Africa's energy emergency

In a recent article for the Center for American Progress, Rebecca Schultz writes about the drain on African economies from importing oil—so significant that it may be offsetting the gains of the World Bank’s Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. The world’s rising oil prices pose a particularly serious threat to Africa’s urban working classes, the cornerstones of countries’ development.

Much has already been made of the ‘oil curse’ in Africa, wherein oil exportation has dragged down the economies by corrupting the politics of countries like Nigeria, Sudan, and Cameroon. But in countries such as Senegal and Uganda, which lack exploitable reserves of their own and have to import their petroleum, oil is taking a similarly devastating toll—and it’s only getting worse.

In Senegal, a bastion of stability and democracy in West Africa, the burden of powering its diesel generators is eroding the once promising prospect of achieving the MDGs. The government is paying twice what it did a few years ago to import oil, which amounts to seven times what it receives in debt relief and is equal to what it spends on education and health care combined—about 8.5% of GDP.

In Uganda, the squeeze of fuel prices and the shroud of blackouts have become parts of everyday life. The country adheres to an austere load-shedding schedule, whereby power is cut to areas every other day, which is costing the economy, at minimum, $250 million per year. Most of Uganda’s electricity comes from hydroelectric dams on the Nile, but with Lake Victoria’s water level falling as a result of global warming, the output from those plants is diminishing, which forced Uganda to buy two diesel generators in 2006. Those cost the government $150 million to run annually, which has led to the doubling of electricity bills in the last year and to widespread diesel shortages. In a country that has a per capita GDP of $280, people pay more for fuel than in the U.S.—$5.50 per gallon at filling stations and $0.24 per kilowatt hour of electricity, three times the $0.08/kWh that Americans pay.

Many other African countries face similar troubles—e.g., Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and the Gambia in West Africa, like Senegal, import 100% of their oil; Tanzania, Kenya, Rwanda, and Burundi in East Africa, like Uganda, depend on the shrinking capacity of hydroelectricity.

Schultz writes: “The World Bank estimates that poverty has increased as much as 6 percent in some parts of the world due to the hike in oil prices in recent years. ... The poorest countries in the world consume an almost negligible share of the millions of barrels of oil consumed every day globally, yet they are hit the most by rising world oil prices—and then hit again by the effects of climate change associated with burning hydrocarbons.”

Indeed, Africa pays a disproportionate price for the oil consumption and greenhouse gas emissions of the U.S., Western Europe, and China. But the continent’s own fossil-fuel burning also contributes to the problem and is part of a vicious circle that poses imminent economic and environmental threats. This problem is particularly acute in a place like Uganda, which, as it burns more diesel to compensate for its increasingly ineffective dams, only aggravates their impotence by contributing to the forces desiccating Lake Victoria in the first place.

This cycle is also likely more malignant, and its effects more direct, than many might assume. While Africa’s GHG contributions may be marginal in the bigger picture, there are other anthropogenic factors in play—black carbon, commonly known as soot, now appears to have a major global warming impact. In fact, research indicates that BC may have a larger effect than even methane, making it second only to carbon dioxide as a warming agent.

BC particulates are released from inefficient combustion, such as in diesel engines, wood and charcoal cookstoves, and outdoor biomass burning—all prevalent throughout Africa. Because of its ill effects on human health (the WHO reports 2.7 million people die annually from air pollution), BC emissions have been reduced substantially in most of the developed world; so, for a country like the U.S., where 99% of light-duty vehicles use gasoline and the diesel vehicles that are on the road abide by relatively strict particulate emission standards, soot may not seem to present much of a threat. But in Africa, where diesel is the norm, there are weak or nonexistent emission standards, and vehicles are often purchased second-hand from wealthier countries and thus tend to have older, more worn-down engines that emit more particulates, the hazards are great.

Rich countries are able to offload much of the cost of their GHG pollution onto poor countries because global warming affects everywhere equally. For developing countries, however, while BC contributes to net warming too, its immediate effects aren’t dispersed uniformly in the way those of GHGs are, instead tending to be much more proximate in space and time. So, in addition to propagating overall warming, BC also brings more localized ecological perils.

While aerosols—sulfates, nitrates, carbonaceous particles (including BC), sea salt, and mineral dust—have typically been thought to have a cooling effect on the atmosphere, offsetting global warming, BC seems to be an exception—though it blocks sunlight from reaching the surface, because it is black it absorbs this light rather than reflecting it, thereby warming the atmosphere.

Generally, BC alters surface pressures and winds, affecting temperatures, clouds, and precipitation. More specifically, it increases air temperature relative to ground temperature—because it warms the atmosphere while blocking sunlight—one result of which is reduced overall precipitation. But because the air heated by BC also becomes less stable, spurring convection, clouds are attracted and bring rainfall to otherwise dry areas, which is then balanced elsewhere by subsidence (the downward movement of air), making other areas drier. Such changes can be devastating to the delicate balance struck by many Africans living at subsistence levels and the fragile economies they occupy. And, returning to Uganda’s energy woes, while it’s difficult to link Lake Victoria’s falling water level to any one cause, it’s reasonable to think that the smog emitted from Nairobi, Kampala, Arusha, and elsewhere around the lake’s shores is playing a role in the droughts afflicting the region.

The silver lining of BC’s localized effects is that there are thus also local solutions. About half the BC comes from energy generation, the other half mostly from open burning of vegetation. So, more efficient diesel engines, cleaner cookstoves, greener agricultural practices, and of course alternative fuel sources are all viable avenues for ending the cycle of fossil-fuel burning, environmental degradation, and thus more fuel burning. And, as Schultz points out, the opportunities are vast for cultivating renewable energy in Africa. South Africa, Morocco, Madagascar, Kenya, and Ethiopia all show potential for wind power generation, both coastal and inland, and forthcoming studies in Namibia and Angola are expected to show the same. As well, the Rift Valley has a 9,000-megawatt geothermal electrical potential, which could feasibly solve the power problems of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Kenya, and Uganda. Africa’s fertile farmland is also ripe for harvesting biofuels; 60% of the continent’s population currently lives off agriculture, already growing desirable fuels like sugarcane, maize, and soy, while other plants, like jatropha, a bush that grows on arid land not likely to be in use for food production, might soon be added to the list. South Africa, in fact, already has an $800 million plan for building a biofuel industry, and Kenya is preparing to have a go at photovoltaic cell assembly, as prices are dropping and use is expected to expand with newer, cheaper Chinese-made cells.

Changes can occur on a much smaller scale, too, and oil isn’t the only type of fuel that begs for an alternative. For instance, Barrett Sheridan wrote recently in Newsweek about a Berkeley physicist, Ashok Gadgil, who has developed a stove for Darfuris that requires 75% less firewood. The persistent need to find wood in Darfur’s barren landscape has put countless women and children at risk of murder, mutilation, and rape since the conflict erupted. As the environment deteriorates and the security situation fails to improve, Darfuris have had to travel farther, for longer times, in increasingly dangerous areas to find fuel to cook their food. This new stove could reduce significantly the need for such treacherous trips and could save people as much as $200 a year in money that might otherwise be spent on purchasing firewood.

Schultz writes that Africa’s oil troubles are likely to hit the urban poor and the working class the hardest; but, with Darfur as an extreme example, oil constitutes only one facet of a larger energy crisis—between the degradation of natural resources from forces like deforestation and desertification, the rising costs of importing outside resources like oil, and the environmental and human health impacts of so many common, nonrenewable fuels, the need for change is becoming dire.

It’s important, however, to avoid succumbing to seductively simplistic explanations, such as theories based on environmental determinism, and asserting that the array of troubles facing African nations—be they Kampala’s blackouts or Darfur’s protracted fighting—are a product of the constraints of the natural environment and how humans have used—and abused—it. Undoubtedly, there are also much more human elements involved—e.g., the brutal tactics of the Khartoum regime, or the Ugandan government’s development and resource management policies. But, with news media and foreign donors who tend to focus on the latest natural or manmade disaster, it’s also easy to ignore the root causes of so many of these problems, of which Africa’s energy crisis is perhaps the preeminent one.

If alternatives aren’t soon found at every level, from the woman who risks her life searching for increasingly scarce firewood to the country straining its economy to import oil, it is hard to see how much progress can be made on more immediate problems, like persistent conflict, political corruption, or foundering economies. Engaging Africa in international efforts to forestall global warming while pushing for homegrown solutions at macro and micro levels should be a priority of Western and African leaders alike. Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade might serve as one model: he has signed an agreement with Brazil to bring its technical expertise in this realm to Africa through a series of educational exchanges, and he is founding a “green OPEC,” a coalition of “13 non-petroleum producing African nations with a mission to create jobs and enhance political and economic security by diversifying away from oil into clean energy.”

Easterly on celebrity advocacy

Not to beat a dead horse, but Bill Easterly had an interesting op-ed in the L.A. Times last week about celebrity advocacy on Africa. Easterly’s central point is that efforts like Vanity Fair’s Africa issue tend to paint a much darker picture of the continent than it deserves, and they tend to gloss over many of the more positive stories.*

Easterly lends an economist’s perspective to the issue, pointing out that, for instance, on average 0.00926% of Africans die from war each year. Child soldiers, people afflicted by famine, and those who have died of AIDS also each account for 0.5% of the population, or less.

“That doesn't lessen the tragedy, of course, of those who are such victims, and maybe there are things the West can do to help them. But the typical African is a long way from being a starving, AIDS-stricken refugee at the mercy of child soldiers. The reality is that many more Africans need latrines than need Western peacekeepers — but that doesn't play so well on TV.”

Even official accounts tend to dwell on the negatives, like Tony Blair’s Africa Progress Panel, which held that Africa fell “far short” of making “substantial inroads into poverty reduction.” Easterly says the “international development establishment is rigging the game to make Africa—which is, of course, still very poor—look even worse than it really is.” When it’s noted that Africa is the only region failing to meet the MDGs, this is not because the situation isn’t improving but because most African countries have had so much further to go than anywhere else—it is, for instance, much harder to cut in half extreme poverty when half the population is poor, versus, say, a tenth, as was the case in Latin America.

In truth, African economies have been growing at a rate of 6% for three consecutive years, cell phone and Internet use have been doubling each year for seven years, annual foreign private capital inflows are outweighing foreign aid at $38 billion, and Africans on average tend to save a higher percentage of their incomes than Americans do.

In the end, “Africans are and will be escaping poverty the same way everybody else did: through the efforts of resourceful entrepreneurs, democratic reformers and ordinary citizens at home, not through PR extravaganzas of ill-informed outsiders.”

He concludes, “Today, as I sip my Rwandan gourmet coffee and wear my Nigerian shirt here in New York, and as European men eat fresh Ghanaian pineapple for breakfast and bring Kenyan flowers home to their wives, I wonder what it will take for Western consumers to learn even more about the products of self-sufficient, hardworking, dignified Africans. Perhaps they should spend less time consuming Africa disaster stereotypes from television and Vanity Fair.”

While I pretty much sympathize wholeheartedly with Easterly’s point, I think it’s important to highlight a stark hypocrisy in his approach. While he criticizes celebrities and officials alike for painting Africa with a broad brush and overemphasizing its development failures, Easterly essentially uses the same tactic in his books The White Man’s Burden and, especially, The Elusive Quest for Growth for critiquing the foreign aid establishment.

The basic premise of Elusive Quest, for instance, is that proposed panacea after proposed panacea for global poverty, coming especially from the World Bank and IMF and starting with the “financing gap” approach all the way through the Washington Consensus and the latest incarnations of aid conditionality, have failed to pan out. This assertion relies on figures (e.g., the number of people living in poverty has stagnated for three decades) that suggest that 60 years of assistance haven’t made a dent in the problem—a fact that, if true, would render his argument particularly devastating, but one which, looked at objectively, I think would be hard to support in earnest.

While Easterly’s analyses often incorporate good and abundant data, if he’s going to be so critical of the advocacy methods of Bono and Friends, he ought to show some restraint himself.


* My bias on this issue is pretty clear, I think—I did after all write in the introductory post to this blog: “Africa … has so many happy and hopeful stories that often go untold; and … we, as citizens of wealthy countries, are not now, nor will we ever be, Africa’s saviors,” and I quoted Paul Theroux, who said, “The impression that Africa is fatally troubled and can be saved only by outside help—not to mention celebrities and charity concerts—is a destructive and misleading conceit.”

Sudan roundup

In his New York Times column on Monday, Nicholas Kristof returns to the topic of Darfur, describing Khartoum's campaign to change the demographics of Darfur by encouraging Arabs from other African countries to settle in areas where non-Arabs have been driven out, and criticizing Bush for not putting enough pressure on Khartoum by, say, delivering a prime-time speech on the subject. He also acknowledges a link between Darfur and the North-South conflict, warning that impunity in Darfur might make Khartoum more likely to renew the war with the South.

An angle Kristof doesn't mention is the impact of the Darfur conflict on national elections scheduled for 2009. Alex De Waal, of the Social Science Research Council, has argued that the elections are the international community's best chance to change the government in Sudan. The BBC examines the prospects of an electoral victory for the Southern SPLM. If the NCP regime's potential opponents in Darfur are all displaced or in refugee camps, this decreases the chances for an electoral alliance with the SPLM that could defeat the NCP. And as the Darfur crisis hogs the attention of the international community, less energy is spent on the many preparations that are needed for these elections to actually take place.

In other news:

• Hillary Clinton endorsed the idea of a NATO-enforced no-fly zone for Darfur. Julie Flint, writing in The New York Times, says that's a terrible idea. Alex De Waal, co-author with Flint on a book on Darfur, agrees. Michael Jacobson, of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, says the new US sanctions on Khartoum (remember those?) could have some meaningful impact. Meanwhile, U.S. Darfur envoy Andrew Natsios is currently visiting the country.

• A resolution for a joint UN-AU force of up to 26,000 is being prepared in the Security Council. France's new foreign minister suggested that French troops might make up a large part of the planned UN force for Darfur. But MSF president Jean-Herve Bradol thinks that sending foreign troops would be counterproductive. In the meantime, Nigeria's Rodolphe Adada has taken over as the head of the AU mission. And Eric Reeves blasts UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon's optimistic public statements on Darfur.

• Majzoub al-Khalifa, an advisor to President al-Bashir and the government's chief negotiator on Darfur, was killed in a car crash late last month. Alex De Waal, who negotiated with al-Khalifa, pays critical but respectful tribute. Bashir has also replaced the governor of South Darfur state.

• A meeting in Libya with AU and UN representatives will try to unite the various rebel factions in Darfur. But the Christian Science Monitor describes the challenge of achieving cooperation between the numerous factions, even as more and more turn against Khartoum. Meanwhile, the leader of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) removed the rebel group's top military commander.

• Southern Sudan's President, Salva Kiir, has reshuffled the cabinet of the southern government. The Sudan Tribune provides some reactions. Reuters takes a look too. The BBC also looks at the challenge of establishing an education system in the South.

• A deadline for Northern and Southern troops to redeploy from contested areas has passed, with troops from both sides still remaining. One-third of Northern troops have yet to be withdrawn, most of whom are in oil regions.

• The Christian Science Monitor examines China's participation in UN peacekeeping in Sudan. China also has a new ambassador to Sudan.
  

• An IRIN story takes a critical look at the claim that climate change is driving the Darfur conflict. Alex De Waal also provides a thorough discussion of the question.
  

• To add to its problems, Sudan is being ravaged by flash floods, with the Interior Ministy raising a state of alert.
  

Somalia update

Although the situation in Mogadishu has been relatively calm compared with the violence that plagued the city throughout the spring, stability in Somalia remains tenuous.

The Somali National Reconciliation Congress (NRC) was due to take place in Mogadishu on July 16, but the congress is likely to be postponed again. The NRC ambitiously hopes to reconcile the clans, a necessary step for political reconciliation, as well as to organize a new constitution and create a road map for elections in 2009. However, the NRC only allows delegations from clans, civil society and the Islamists are also notably excluded. Patrick Smith of Africa Confidential, fears that the British, Americans, Europeans and Ethiopians will interfere in the process, just as external parties manipulated the Somalia negotiations in Kenya from 2002-2004.

One thing uniting diverse Somali clans and religious groups is the desire to see Ethiopian troops leave their country. The Ethiopian government, having grown increasingly concerned about the Islamists' rising influence, sent troops across the border at the end of 2006. No coordinated militia groups opposed the Ethiopian forces, and the fighting was over almost instantly. But since then, Ethiopian forces have had a difficult time leaving Somalia. Adding to the chaos, Eritrea has also re-entered the regional turmoil, pushing Somali opposition figures to form a government-in-exile.

AMISON troops are meant to replace Ethiopian forces— a contingent of 1,600 Burundian soldiers is due to be deployed next month; France is supposed to transfer soldiers from Bujumbura to Mogadishu, and the USA is meant to provide equipment. When (or if) this happens, Ethiopian troops will likely pull back only to the border, remaining poised to return.

Africa Confidential mentions that Ethiopia is starting to feel the financial burden of its military excursions in Somalia. David Ignatius and Stephanie McCrummen of the Washington Post, and Sadia Ali Aden of the Council on Foreign Relations are just a few of the many authors who have compared Ethiopia's venture in Somalia to America's intervention in Iraq.

Other authors have directly linked Somalia to the U.S. War on Terror. A report released by Chatham House in May argued that the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia was strongly backed by the U.S. government. The report argues that the Islamic Courts Union had won widespread support among the Somali people for providing security that is unlikely to diminish. Farah Ali Hassan at The Conservative Voice writes perhaps one of the more scathing critiques of the Chatham House report.

John Prendergast and Colin Thomas-Jensen explain U.S. policy in the region in the April issue of Foreign Affairs. They write: "the United States' counterterrorism policy in the Greater Horn of Africa now hinges on three strategies: almost unconditional support for the Ethiopian government, extremely close cooperation on counterterrorism with Khartoum, and occasional but spectacular forays into Somalia in the hope of killing or capturing al Qaeda suspects."

It is hard to know what should be done in Somalia, but it is clear that the country needs urgent attention. Somalia is ranked third in the failed states index published in the current issue of Foreign Policy. Although Sudan and Iraq (numbers 1 and 2 respectively) surpass Somalia on certain indicators of state failure, it is hard to imagine a state with less of a government than Somalia. External support, including peacekeeping forces, may be necessary to bring stability required for any semblance of a government to organize. But the lines of intervention are blurred in a world where, as David Ignatius says, "war-fighting and nation-building have become perversely mixed."

Come on, Kristof

After a series of articles "long on gloom and suffering", from his take-a-student-to-Africa trip, New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof turns to a story of hope: Rwanda. Kristof gushes about how the cops pull over drivers to tell them to fasten their seat belts instead of to ask for bribes, and about how President Paul Kagame reads the Harvard Business Review. This is fine, Rwanda's development and order in the past decade have been impressive.

But Kristof ignores a couple of things. First, Rwanda is nice and orderly because the regime is extremely repressive. Kristof is aware of this, but dismisses it in one line by acknowledging that Kagame is "authoritarian, repressive, and quirky," sandwiched between how he is "honest, intelligent and capable" and how he "did wonders" for the standard of living. Yes, the press has little freedom, but Kagame reads the Harvard Business Review, so it's ok.

Second, Kristof seems to be respecting Kagame's ban on talking about the 1994 genocide and ethnic tension. It's great that Rwanda has been able to develop so much since the tragedy, but a victor's justice that makes little attempt at reconciliation, along with reprisals by the Tutsi-led FPR rebels-turned-army against Hutus in Rwanda and the DRC, decrease the chances that this grim cycle is over. I recently got around to reading A Continent for the Taking, by the Times' former Central Africa correspondent, Howard French, and I wonder how French - extremely critical of Kagame's actions in the DRC in the mid-90s - would react to Kristof's endorsement of the regime.

Yes, there is much to praise in Rwanda's recent history, but plenty to condemn as well. I would have hoped he could have come up with a better example of optimism for the continent. I, for one, will be holding off on investing in real estate in Kigali for now.